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Integrating the traditional and the 




The study examines the modalities for integrating traditional and modern 
conflict management strategies in Nigeria using an analysis of relevant 
documents as well as Black’s Social Control Theory and Thomas-Kilmann’s 
Model of Conflict Management. The successful amalgamation of diverse groups 
has radically shifted from being a platform for peaceful coexistence to an arena 
of violent conflicts due to the matrix of social inequality and the state attempts 
to undermine the power of traditional social control systems. The police and 
military have been used to suspend several violent conflicts in Nigeria, but they 
have been unable to build peace despite their coercive power. The social structure 
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and deep-seated grievances that generate violence have not been addressed and 
the crowding out of traditional methods of social control from official policies 
has left room for escalation of violent conflicts. The most disturbing of these 
conflicts are ethno-religious and resource-control conflicts, which have both 
resulted in monumental destruction of peoples and properties and exposed 
different parts of Nigeria to crisis. It is argued that a policy-driven synergy of 
useful traditional and modern strategies for conflict management will result in 
lasting peace in Nigeria.
Introduction
Efficient and effective management of conflicts is fundamental to the 
development of any society, but the prevailing situations in Nigeria constitute 
a reversal of this reality. The Nigerian success story of amalgamation of diverse 
groups in 1914 has radically shifted from a platform for peaceful coexistence 
to an arena of violence and gradual disintegration. The popular explanations 
for this unexpected situation include colonialism, corruption and political 
instability. The matrix of social inequality and the state attempts to undermine 
the power of traditional social control systems are also potent factors, but there 
is inadequate research on this subject matter. 
The spate of insecurity and threats to lives and properties in Nigeria has reached 
alarming proportions despite the increasing visibility of the Nigerian state 
mobile police and military in the management of internal conflicts (The US 
Department of State 2008; Erinosho 2007; Falola 1998). About 50 episodes 
of violent conflict, which culminated in the death of over 10 000 persons and 
internal displacement of over 300 000 people, were recorded in Nigeria between 
1999 and 2003 (International Crisis Group 2009). The recent (28–29 November 
2008) violent conflict in Jos (a city in the north-central) resulted in the death 
of over 380 persons and destruction of properties worth millions of naira 
(Adinoyi 2009; Balogun 2009; Eya 2009; USAID 2005). Considering the increase 
of violent conflicts and occasional state failure in the maintenance of peace and 
order in Nigeria, this study is anchored by the following questions: How has 
Nigerian society coped with its monumental profile of violent conflict? Why 
are extant conflict management strategies defective? What are the modalities for 
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integrating traditional and modern conflict management strategies in Nigeria? 
These questions are addressed through content analysis of relevant documents. 
This study is situated within the confines of Black’s Social Control Theory 
and Thomas-Kilmann’s Model of Conflict Management to provide a robust 
foundation for the explanation of processes involved in peace-building in Nigeria. 
Black's theory proposes the conditions that predict the use of one of five forms 
of social control (self-help, avoidance, negotiation, settlement, and toleration) in 
the relationship between individuals, groups, and organisations, while Thomas-
Kilmann’s model explains strategic intentions that could be organised around the 
matrix of two factors (assertiveness and cooperativeness), which jointly produce 
five conflict management styles (avoidance, accommodation, competition, 
compromise and collaboration) (Volkema and Bergmann 1995; Borg 1992; 
Black 1990; Thomas 1992). The established complexity of violent conflicts in 
Nigeria requires a combination of approaches as proposed in this study. The 
combination is also needed for theoretical and methodological support in the 
proposed integration of traditional and modern conflict management strategies. 
The above perspectives have been used extensively in American academic 
research, training seminars and development studies; however few studies have 
linked the intentions measured by the model with actual behaviours (Volkema 
and Bergmann 1995; Borg 1992). This study includes an attempt to contribute 
towards further development of the theories through an examination of their 
applicability to the management of Nigeria’s protracted violent conflicts. Black’s 
theory and Thomas-Kilmann’s model are contemporary versions of the two-
dimensional modes of conflict management introduced by Blake and Mouton 
in 1964 (Volkema and Bergmann 1995). 
According to Thomas-Kilmann’s model, assertiveness flows from concerns for 
self-interest, while cooperativeness is driven by concerns for the other party 
or the relationship (Thomas 1992). This assertion has opened up the stage for 
a discourse on conflict management strategies in Nigeria where self-interest 
remains paramount in the country’s political economy. As defined by Black 
(1990:43), conflict management is ‘the handling of grievances’. This definition 
is adopted for this study due to its simplicity and relative applicability. The 
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conditions under which each of Black’s conflict management styles is likely to 
occur differ (Borg 1992). 
The above mentioned dichotomy implies that self-help or avoidance may be 
preferred in some situations, while negotiation or settlement would be required 
in others, especially if toleration is not possible. In Nigeria, some of these 
strategies are more likely than others to be used in the context of ‘order from 
above’ at the expense of ethnic minorities or the less-privileged groups. The 
minorities and the less-privileged groups may also resort to alternative strategies 
in their relationships with the more powerful groups. Individuals and groups that 
share relatively equal status – like the Nigerian Muslims and Christians – may 
also adopt a different approach to conflict management. In this regard, existing 
strategies for the management of Nigeria’s violent conflicts can be located within 
the classifications in Black’s theory and Thomas-Kilmann’s model. 
The USAID’s (2005) argument that the Nigerian government’s capacities for 
managing conflicts are weak appears valid because the government has not 
fully considered the utility of every available strategy for conflict management. 
When conflicts erupt, the inability of the Nigerian mobile police to manage 
them usually prompts the Nigerian government to deploy the Nigerian military 
to the scene of violence where the military are usually mandated to ‘shoot on 
sight.’ This situation sometimes leads to serious human rights violations and 
escalation of violence (Ibeanu 2006). The state’s imposition of curfew and use 
of propaganda to douse public tension are part of the Nigerian government’s 
regular strategies for conflict management in Nigeria. In view of the perceived 
inability of the Nigerian security forces to safeguard human lives in Nigeria, 
a considerable number of people in the country have however subscribed to 
unofficial strategies (vigilante, militias, charms, prayers, communal solidarity, 
etc) in their attempts to manage Nigeria’s violent conflicts. 
The emerging strategies in the management of Nigeria’s violent conflicts have 
a strong foundation in African traditional cultures. Contrary to general belief 
in western paradigms, every African community has capacities for promoting 
mutual understanding and peaceful coexistence (Lauer 2007). Uncritical 
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adoption of Western approaches to conflict management has adversely affected 
the stability and development of many African societies including Nigeria. 
In light of the foregoing, this study focuses on the possibility of integrating 
both traditional and modern conflict management strategies for peace-building 
and development in Nigeria. The next sections deal with various issues around 
the subject mater of this study: factors influencing violent conflicts in Nigeria, 
official strategies for conflict management in Nigeria, traditional strategies for 
conflict management in Nigeria, shortcomings in Nigeria’s conflict management 
strategies, integration of traditional and modern strategies for conflict 
management, and conclusion. 
Factors fuelling violent conflicts in Nigeria
Several studies attribute Nigeria’s violent conflicts to the failure of its political 
elite to accept democratic principles of accountability, equity, justice and the 
rule of law (Bamgbose 2009; Piiparinen 2007; Abubakar 2006; Adejumobi 2005). 
Also, most violent conflicts in Nigeria have been traced to contested bases of 
citizenship rights, greed, predatory rule, autocracy, and unresolved grievances. 
Prolonged military rule and centralisation of power around Nigeria’s remarkable 
resources aid rent seeking, thereby making it a qualified case for a ‘resource curse’ 
thesis as shown in a previous study by Collier and Hoeffler (2005). Different 
forces such as colonialism, neo-colonialism, dictatorship, alienation, poverty, 
unemployment, illiteracy, infrastructural decay, ethnic rivalry and religious 
intolerance constitute the root causes of Nigeria’s violent conflicts. These factors 
transcend the regular causes of violent conflicts in Africa: political history, 
population, resource insecurity and war economies. There is general agreement 
among scholars that a monolithic explanation of violent conflicts in Nigeria is 
inadequate (Guseh and Oritsejafor 2007; Ibeanu 2006; Meagher 2004; Falola 
1998). The merger of ethnicity and religion has played out with involvement of 
southerners and northerners in violent conflicts, which cannot be divorced from 
the political economy of contemporary Nigeria. The holistic causative factors of 
violent conflict are worthy of recognition in the process of peace-building and 
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its sustainability. Instances of religion-driven violent conflict were described by 
Falola (1998:2–3) as shown in the following passage: 
Since the mid-seventies, politicians have urged their followers to vote along 
religious lines – Muslims are told to vote for Muslims, and Christians for 
Christians. In 1978, the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) told its followers 
in one of its strong Islamic northern constituencies that the two-fingered 
V-for-victory sign of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) was a covert 
symbol of polytheism, an idea counter to fundamental Islamic doctrine. 
The NPN adopted one raised finger as their symbol, turning the universal 
(and universally secular) V sign into a religious issue … The gubernatorial 
elections in Lagos and Kaduna were deeply affected by religious issue, 
and the primary process for the 1993 election of a civilian president was 
complicated by conflicts between Muslim and Christian candidates. Many 
analysts date the beginning of Nigeria’s religious crisis to 1978 (excluding 
the jihad of 1804)… two religious issues related to whether Nigeria would 
become a secular state or subscribe to al-Shari’a, the Islamic code of laws, 
disrupted the constitutional making process… Other religious inspired 
controversies during the 1970s included the rejection of the recitation of 
the national anthem and pledge by the Jehovah’s Witnesses, … and the calls 
by Christian leaders for state-supported pilgrimage to Jerusalem (Muslims 
were already being sponsored in pilgrimages to Mecca) … In 1980, the 
Maitasine crisis claimed thousands of lives (the government conservatively 
estimated the death toll at just over four thousand) and caused millions 
of naira in property damage. On the last day of October 1982, eight large 
churches were burned in the prominent city of Kano … A major riot in 
Kaduna the same year claimed at least four hundred lives. In 1984, violence 
sparked by Muslims in Yola and Jimeta killed approximately seven hundred 
people (including policemen) and left nearly six thousand people homeless. 
The neighbouring town of Gombe was also besieged, resulting in the 
death of more than one hundred people … In March 1987, Christians in 
Kafanchan wantonly destroyed the property of local Muslims. Within three 
days, every one of the hundred churches in Zaria was burned and many 
Christians had been slaughtered.
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Besides religion, poverty has become a major root cause of Nigeria’s violent 
conflicts given the emerging flows from the economy of violence in the country. 
In different areas of Nigeria, the unemployed and underemployed youths have 
embarked on a range of violent activities in search for livelihoods. This situation 
has produced heroes in the context of political thuggery, assassination, militancy, 
and ethnic massacre. Some relatively impoverished youth have gravitated into 
religious fundamentalism with networks stretching across Africa and Saudi 
Arabia in the case of Islam, and to England and the United States in the case of 
Pentecostal Christianity (Meagher 2004; Falola 1998). The emerging disorder 
from communal violence can be understood in this context, which closely ties 
with the rise in corruption. 
The Nigerian government’s reactions, including the implementation of 
neoliberal policies, have attenuated the human capacities for development, 
thereby building the socio-psychological bases for violence. In the context of 
the structural adjustment programme and its concomitant trade liberalisation 
which resulted in dumping of foreign goods in the Nigerian markets, several 
thousands of local entrepreneurs abandoned their primary occupations 
following their inability to cover production costs. A crop of youth, who were 
rendered underemployed by the adverse effects of neoliberal reforms on their 
productive activities in Aba metamorphosed into the Bakassi Boys vigilante 
group in 1998; and some politicians hijacked the group in 2000 in their struggle 
against the Federal government. 
The Bakassi Boys were involved in an ethnic riot in which 300 northern Nigerian 
migrants were slaughtered and in the abduction and assassination of political 
opponents prior to the 2003 elections (Meagher 2007). Their increasingly 
violent activities made them the subject of a Human Rights Watch Report in 
2002. Other organisations including the Hisha in the north and the Oodua 
People’s Congress (OPC) in the south-west also emerged and fuelled violence in 
the context of widespread frustrations. These militia groups do not represent a 
cultural propensity to violent conflicts, but reflect the impact of severe economic 
stress and state neglect on dynamic local institutions. People are perceived in 
terms of their ethnicity, religion and social class, and the citizenship question 
connects with these forces in conflict-prone areas. 
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Also, state promulgations, including the Petroleum Act of 1969 and the Land 
Use Decree of 1978, favoured the Nigerian government and multinational 
companies in the country and resulted in the restriction of communities’ access 
to land. This situation and the chronic deprivation associated with it contribute 
to the rising spate of violence in Nigeria. Local elites in the oil-producing 
communities have reacted violently against the Nigerian government and oil 
companies through social movements and the use of ethnic-oriented militia 
tactics. Guseh and Oritsejafor (2007:140) explain the foundation of Nigeria’s 
violent conflicts as follows: 
The country has experienced numerous military coups and counter 
coups and has survived a secessionist civil war. The attainment of political 
independence does not seem to have transformed the state because the 
indigenous elites that replaced the colonial administrators have failed 
to implement policies to move the country forward politically and 
economically. The indigenous elites inherited a state that was not designed 
to cater to the needs of the Nigerian people; yet these elites were content 
with the political structures designed by the colonialists. 
Collier and Hoeffler (2005:632) mention other factors that fuel the proliferation 
of violent conflicts in Nigeria: 
Case studies as well as cross-country studies suggest that countries with 
an abundance of natural resources are more prone to violent conflict … 
in the Delta region of Nigeria, large-scale organized crime is ‘bunkering’ 
(i.e., stealing) oil from pipelines to the scale of around $1 billion per year, 
selling it in East Asia. There is obviously scope for this massive criminal 
activity to link with the political secessionists of the Delta region. Resources 
can motivate conflict, especially in the form of secessions. Secessionists not 
only claim ownership of the resources, they also claim that the national 
authorities are misusing the money – that it is being embezzled by distant 
elites. Perhaps the best defense against such secessionist pressures is to 
make the secessionists look greedy. To achieve this, national governments 
should probably link resource revenues to some basic social service such as 
primary education. 
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The resource curse thesis can be refuted in light of the models of resource-
endowed peaceful countries including Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Canada, 
Australia, the United States of America and the United Kingdom (Cappelen and 
Mjøset 2009). Resource-endowed communities need not be prone to violence 
and underdevelopment. For instance, the relatively peaceful Norwegian society 
had relied on raw materials export and combined economic growth with an 
egalitarian distribution of income long before its discovery of petroleum. The 
logic of the resource curse can be dispelled in this way and a plausible argument 
can be built around lack of transformational leadership as a major determinant 
of violent conflict in resource-endowed settings. The question may not be about 
resource abundance but the quality of leadership in charge of the abundant 
resources. Kotlyar and Karakowsky (2006) examined the relationship between 
leadership styles and group conflict and their findings support the assertion that: 
… differences in leadership behaviors can trigger different levels of cognitive 
and affective conflict among group members. Behaviors reflective of the 
transformational style of leadership demonstrated the greatest capacity 
to motivate group members to constructively debate ideas. However, in 
contrast to transactional and external leader behaviors, transformational 
leadership behaviors also showed a greater capacity for igniting affective 
conflict among group members (Kotlyar and Karakowsky 2006:377).
Official strategies for conflict management in Nigeria
The Nigerian government’s major official strategies for managing violent conflict 
include state creation and the use of the Nigerian mobile police, the Nigerian 
military, curfew, propaganda, judicial panel, compensations and punishment. 
These official strategies have however not yielded adequate results since the 
1960s. Nigeria was originally administered as an amalgam of two protectorates 
before the establishment of new structures such as regions and geo-political 
zones and states (12 states in May 1967, 19 states in February 1976, 21 states in 
September 1987, 30 states in 1991 and 36 states in 1996). The outcome of states 
creation has been summarised by Otite (2000:vii) as follows: 
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These new developments, which were responses to ethnic-sectional 
demands for new identities or consolidations of old ones, also created 
new bases for contested territorial and other claims, as well as competition 
for access or succession to high political and other offices. They were also 
responses to protests against perceived sectional marginalisation in respect 
of participation in, and the dividends derived from, the political and 
economic development of Nigeria under democratic process. 
The Nigerian mobile police and the Nigerian military have been used to suspend 
many cases of conflicts in Nigeria. They have succeeded in restoring order in 
most cases of violent conflicts, but their intervention usually gets to the violence 
scene after colossal wastage of human lives and valuable properties. In view 
of their late responses, the coercive power of the state has been unable to stop 
preventable violence in Nigeria. Scholars (Thomas and Pondy 1977) have shown 
that time lag would affect the effectiveness of conflict management activities. 
Some documented evidence of the failure of the Nigerian mobile police and the 
Nigerian military in their endeavours to prevent violent conflicts and restore 
social order are summarised here. In May 1996, eight people lost their lives 
when the police clashed with a group of Muslim students. The following month, 
Muslim students at the Kaduna Polytechnic Institute clashed with the police over 
the hosting of a beauty contest, which they claimed debased Islam. The school 
had to be closed down to prevent a prolonged escalation of the conflict. Chances 
that the government could end religious violence with violence of its own 
became minimal when the federal government itself evidenced a bias for Islam 
by secretly joining the Organisation of the Islamic Conference in January 1986. 
The Christian reaction frightened the military government, and a government 
effort to defuse tension by means of the National Advisory Council on Religious 
Affairs was abortive. After 1986, religious violence occurred often and without 
notice, with most outbreaks ending in large-scale destruction and the activation 
of the army and police to quell riots and protests. In 1990, a group of civilian-
supported southern Christian military officers decided to forcibly take over 
the government, claiming it was controlled by northern Muslims convinced of 
their ‘birthright to dominate till eternity the political and economic privileges 
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of this great country’. In a radio address, the plotters of the coup announced the 
excision of five Islamic states – Kano, Borno, Katsina, Bauch and Sokoto – from 
the federation. They were unsuccessful, but it was widely speculated that had 
they achieved their goal, another civil war would have been unavoidable (Falola 
1998:4–5).
Furthermore, the Nigerian mobile police forcefully dispersed a large crowd of 
Muslims at the National Theatre in Lagos in an attempt to avert a religious riot in 
the 1980s. After the death of six students in 1978 in a clash between Muslim and 
Christian students of the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, the Nigerian military 
was deployed to quell the crisis. The character of the Nigerian government as it is 
represented by the Nigerian mobile police and the Nigerian military reflects the 
assertiveness clause in Thomas-Kilmann’s model. This character can however be 
expected, given the finding of researchers (Volkema and Bergmann 1995:5) that 
‘preferences for assertiveness are reflected in both strategic and tactical use of 
behaviours, whereas cooperativeness is associated with last-choice behaviours’. 
Nigeria is not the only country with a relatively autocratic government. A recent 
study by Ma (2007) showed that compromise and avoidance are the most 
preferred methods of conflict management in China, while accommodation 
and competition lead to more satisfaction during business negotiation. This 
finding shows that China also has a relatively autocratic government due to her 
traditional history of a unitary state under the control of a single party. The 
Chinese polity embodies an autocracy in the context of democratic communism, 
hence the co-existence between China’s authoritarian national government and 
democratic governance in villages.   
Following the death of over 380 people and destruction of property worth 
millions of naira in a recent (28–29 November 2008) case of violence in Jos, 
curfew was imposed on four districts of the city and the Nigerian soldiers were 
permitted to ‘shoot on sight’ in order to prevent escalation of violence (Balogun 
2009). Flight schedules for Jos were cancelled and roads to the north were blocked. 
The state security agents subsequently arrested 26 suspected mercenaries with 
weapons, including 22 double barrel guns, eight cutlasses, army boots, tear gas, 
charms, and army uniforms (Adinoyi 2009). The suspects were referred to the 
state Criminal Investigation Department (CID) in Jos for further investigation. 
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In view of the failure of the state governor to embark on a timely necessary 
action, the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) set up a judicial panel chaired 
by Emmanuel Abisoye to investigate the Jos violence. The FGN panel was not 
constituted until several weeks after the outbreak of the conflict. However, 
the Plateau State Governor has challenged the FGN’s panel through a court 
injunction, claiming that the FGN has no jurisdiction in managing the conflict 
in the state. In reprisal, the Governor established another judicial panel of 
inquiry chaired by Prince Bola Ajibola (Eya 2009). It can be recalled that the FGN 
suspended the former Governor of the state and declared a state of emergency 
in the state during the previous conflicts in Jos in 2001 and 2004 respectively. 
Presently, the emergence of two judicial panels on the same issue has generated 
controversies in the country and popular opinions are divided on it. 
It is noted that a dominant Islamic organisation expressed dissatisfaction 
over the state-driven parallel judicial panel of inquiry claiming that it would 
honour the panel constituted by the FGN. In contrast, some Jos indigenes were 
said to have planned to disregard the FGN judicial panel due to its perceived 
bias in favour of the Hausa/Muslim community recalling Emmanuel Abisoye’s 
involvement in the trial and elimination of some indigenes of the state during 
the case of late Col. Buka Suka Dimka in Nigeria’s coup of 1976. The emerging 
controversy over the way and manner in which the Nigerian government is 
handling the recent conflict in Jos has set the stage for future conflict in the 
city. The likely continuity of violence in Jos and elsewhere in Nigeria can be 
traced to the principle of attribution, which remains attractive to the majority 
of the population. Attribution implies a process by which blames are shifted 
among parties to a conflict. This process is a fundamental element of conflict 
scenarios in Nigeria where shifting of blames has prolonged peace-building 
efforts. Thomas and Pondy (1977) examined the role of attributed intent within 
conflict episodes, and found that attributions cause hostility and retaliation 
between parties to a conflict. In light of attribution, which may affect perception 
of justice or injustice, individuals tend to perceive themselves as cooperative and 
reasonable, but attribute competitiveness and unreasonableness to the other 
party. This situation provides a basis for resurgence of violence and extension of 
peace-building initiatives in Nigeria.   
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Official strategies used in the south-south include concentrated military 
operations, establishment of commissions, establishment of a new ministry, 
and an amnesty offer. The Nigerian government established the Niger Delta 
Development Commission (NDDC) in 2000 to replace the military-driven Oil 
Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC). The NDDC 
was restructured with a comprehensive master plan in 2007 and a new ministry 
(the Ministry for Niger Delta Affairs) was established in September 2008 for 
infrastructure development and community empowerment in the region. 
Violence remains unabated in the Niger Delta despite the above mentioned 
strategies, thereby confirming Piiparinen’s (2007) report on persistence of the 
root causes of violence in the context of democratic rule with a disconnection 
between policies and practices. 
The prevailing practices in the official strategies for conflict management in 
Nigeria partly fit Black’s theory. Drawing on this theory, it has been argued that: 
… the status of nations within the world-system at a particular time is 
correlated with the primary strategy they use for conflict management 
and … the strategy used may affect the nations’ subsequent rank (Borg 
1992:262). 
The above can be connected with Thomas-Kilmann’s model, which is organised 
around two dimensions: assertiveness and cooperativeness. The former is an 
attempt to satisfy personal concerns, while the latter is an attempt to satisfy 
collective concerns (Thomas 1992). The two dimensions jointly result in five 
modes of conflict management: avoidance, accommodation, competition, 
compromise and collaboration. Both assertiveness and cooperativeness are 
low in avoidance, which usually result in failure to manage violent conflicts. 
Cooperation is higher than assertiveness in accommodation, which entails 
partial management of violent conflicts. Competition in which assertiveness 
is higher than cooperation involves the indiscriminate use of power by one 
group against another in the process of conflict management. Both assertiveness 
and cooperativeness are respectively intermediate and low in compromise and 
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collaboration – which usually yields concessions and desirable outcomes in 
conflict management. 
In light of the above theoretical postulations, the Nigerian government’s styles 
of conflict management include avoidance, accommodation and competition. 
In contrast, the general traditional strategies for conflict resolution largely 
conform to the principles of compromise and collaboration as can be seen in 
the following description. 
In the present research, a conceptualization similar to that of Blake 
and Mouton and Thomas was used to differentiate styles of handling 
interpersonal conflicts on two basic dimensions: concerns for self and for 
others…In superior-subordinate communication, subordinates frequently 
say what is acceptable rather than what they know is true. Therefore, 
an individual may use a more obliging style with superiors than with 
a subordinate or peer… Finally, a compromising approach is expected 
when both parties in a conflict situation have equal power (peers) (Rahim 
1983:368–370). 
Traditional strategies for conflict management in Nigeria 
Several individuals and groups have embarked on new approaches to deal with 
unresolved grievances in Nigeria. A south-south social movement led by Isaac 
Adaka Boro in the 1960s preceded various organisations including the Movement 
for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), which was established in 1990 
in response to the Nigerian government’s repression of the minorities. The 
Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) and the Niger Delta Vigilantes 
(NDV) were established for the same purpose in 2003 and 2004, respectively. 
Similar organisations have been established across Nigeria: the Oodua People’s 
Congress in the southwest, Hisha and Arewa People’s Congress in the north and 
Egbesu Boys in the south-south. This situation finds expression in Anderson and 
Collins’ (1998) observation that oppression generates resistance. They suggest 
that oppression could be resisted effectively through organised actions within a 
group and coalition building with other groups. Resistance from the grassroots 
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has been a fallout of the Nigerian government’s failure to amicably resolve extant 
violent conflicts in the country. The emerging grassroots resistance is driven by 
traditional institutions. 
Traditional institutions are the instruments of social organisation and they 
provide the foundation for social change (Hussain 2007; Ochoche 2002). 
The coexistence of traditional and modern social systems has a long history. 
Traditional methods of social control such as communal solidarity, traditional 
oaths, rewards, vigilantes, informal settlements, checks and balances, 
decentralisation, effective communication and good governance remain strong 
and have been informally used successfully for conflict management in many 
communities in Nigeria. Nwafo Nwanko and Nzelibe (1990) subscribe to the 
observation that African kingdoms are reputed for strict observance of the rule 
of law and the principle of natural justice. 
Indeed, the tradition in most African cultures is that reigning monarchs have 
to go on self-exile, abdicate or commit suicide when found guilty of serious 
offences against the community. Knowing that power tends to corrupt, and 
absolute power corrupts absolutely, traditional social institutions have developed 
necessary in-built mechanisms for preventing power abuse. For instance, the 
Benin Kingdom displayed dexterity in conflict management through effective 
and efficient utilisation of its military strength, public administration, and 
traditional values including loyalty to the system, respect for chieftaincy, and 
communalism. This is a classical example of traditional modernism. The 
traditional values were successfully integrated with the then modern institutions 
of the military and public administration. A previous study by Nwafo Nwanko 
and Nzelibe (1990:259) provided evidence of the usefulness of some traditional 
strategies for conflict management in Africa as follows: 
Africans strongly believe in the concept of ‘communalism.’ This is because 
of their belief that the individual is not alone, but is included under the 
umbrella of the community. The individual is an amulet system which 
is instrumental in linking that person to one’s environment on the basis 
of communication principles and conventions … Conflict management 
follows similar patterns in Africa. Emphasis is placed on internalised values. 
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Value is placed on honesty, openness, empathy, community solidarity, and 
individual loyalty to the group, but not at the expense of recognised worth 
of the individual. Therefore, emphasis is placed on those communication 
patterns and behaviours which will promote the bond of strong and 
productive coexistence of groups in the community. 
The above submission clearly demonstrates the relevance of several traditional 
methods of peace-building in Africa. These methods are still valid but have been 
relegated in official decisions. It is worthy of note that the Nigerian society has 
over the past several years equipped individuals with necessary peacemaking 
skills, but the Nigerian government has not fully recognised the usefulness of 
these skills in its peace-building efforts. Each Nigerian ethnic group has inbuilt 
support for peace. The Yoruba concept of ‘omoluabi’, the Hausa concept of 
‘mutum-kirki’ and the Igbo concept of ‘ezigbu-nwa’ introduce the relevance 
of ontological capacity for peace-building by cultured individuals. The three 
concepts signify individuals with exemplary behaviour. Such individuals may 
not participate in violence irrespective of their anger level. 
There is general support for the use of traditional strategies to manage violence in 
Nigeria as indicated in Afrobarometer’s (2002) survey involving 2 190 Nigerian 
men and women selected across 29 states within the six geo-political zones in 
August 2001. Nigerians prefer informal modes of conflict resolution. Considering 
preferences in the management of Nigeria’s violent conflicts, most respondents 
offered up to three answers in their own words (n = 6305). Taken together, these 
indicate that Nigerians are twice as likely to prefer an informal community-
based process rather than an official intervention by the state government or the 
federal agency (54 versus 26 percent of all responses). At the community level, 
people are most likely to turn to chiefs, headmen or elders to mediate disputes (17 
percent of all responses), especially in the parts of the country where traditional 
leaders continue to perform customary functions. Thereafter, people request 
resolution from religious leaders (14 percent) such as a pastor in a Christian 
church or an imam in an Islamic brotherhood. Interestingly, few people seek 
help from civic or non-governmental organisations (1 percent). In the absence 
of organised channels, people commonly resort to self-help, insisting that ‘the 
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people involved in the conflict’ find a solution for themselves (8 percent) or they 
turn to ‘family, friends and neighbors’ (7 percent). In the extreme, they may even 
enlist the help of vigilante groups (2 percent). In practice, Nigerians see little use 
of government as an agent of conflict resolution. When they mention the central 
government at all, they call on its coercive agencies – the army and the police 
(16 percent of all responses) – rather than on its judicial branch (4 percent). 
Nor do they make use of local courts or local government administration (9 
percent), perhaps because they do not expect fair or effective treatment. In 
keeping with their pride in Nigeria’s status as an African superpower, even fewer 
Nigerians think that international agencies have a role in resolving internal 
conflicts. Predictably, rural dwellers strongly advocated for community-based 
solutions, while urban dwellers are more prone to turn to government. South-
easterners put most faith in community organisations (62 percent) as compared 
to Lagosians, one third of whom would seek out an agency of a local, state, or 
federal government (36 percent). Expectedly, persons who express a religious 
identity tend to prefer religious leaders to resolve conflicts. More interestingly, 
persons who define themselves in terms of their region of origin (e.g. Westerner, 
Easterner) are especially likely to enlist the assistance of a vigilante group.
The survey by Afrobarometer (2002) resonates with Lauer’s (2007:288) call for 
refutation of the notion that ‘[t]he global arena is dominated by the popular 
conviction that Africans require foreign direction in the socio-economic 
management of their own societies’. The relevance of Black’s theory of social 
control and Thomas-Kilmann’s model of conflict management also plays 
out in Afrobarometer’s (2002) findings, which have several implications for 
security management, peace-building, and development in Nigeria. The need 
for a preventive diplomacy and a participatory approach to the management of 
Nigeria’s violent conflicts can be understood in this light. 
Integration of traditional and modern strategies for 
conflict management 
Studies largely indicate that violent conflicts can be managed effectively by 
the disputants themselves or by third parties (Myerson 2009; Milner 2002; 
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Rahim 2000; Wall and Callister 1995). Recognition of this fact would result in 
de-escalation of violence if the affected parties are allowed to take appropriate 
actions. Taking appropriate action is a function of access to an integrated package 
for conflict management. There is a general capacity for people to manage 
violence, but distortion of their histories may render them weak and incapable 
of maintaining peace. The weak institutions, poverty, social inequalities, 
corruption, civil strife, violent conflicts and civil war are not original conditions 
but are rooted in specific historical contexts (Osaghae 2007). In view of the 
above, the realm of social integration is very important in the analysis of conflict 
management strategies. 
An integration of useful complementary values will result in positive 
transformation in a society. The fundamental values that constitute a society can 
be connected in defining the elementary conditions under which the society can 
be regarded to have undergone transformation (Liu 2006:505). Some African 
countries like Ghana have legislative and judicial decentralisation programmes 
‘as a framework for integrating aspects of the existing conflict management 
methods and skills of the national government and the country's ethnic groups’ 
(Fred-Mensah 1999:951).
The modalities for integrating the traditional and the modern conflict 
management strategies in Nigeria require the following mechanisms: 
proper identification and elimination of shortcomings in the extant conflict 
management strategies, resuscitation of useful traditional values that have been 
jettisoned, and the establishment of a national security policy based on a synergy 
of the revised traditional and modern strategies. Many traditional institutions 
with their concomitant beliefs and values have been jettisoned without adequate 
evaluation. Examples of such institutions include the guilds and the guards, 
which safeguarded the political economy of traditional societies.
General beliefs and values involving sacredness of truth, providence, proverbs, 
idioms, oral histories, oral narratives and altruism are important elements 
of the political economy of traditional societies. These beliefs and values are 
usually applied to ensure economic prosperity and political stability. They can 
still contribute towards peace-building in the contemporary Nigerian society 
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even if they are injected into the modern constitution. The Nigerian government 
and traditional institutions can jointly consider and approve the appointment 
of mediators for conflict management. Studies on peace agreements have shown 
the primacy of mediation in the outcome of conflict management (Svensson 
2009). It is argued that: 
… neutral mediators, who are engaged primarily because of their interest to 
end the war, will have incentives to hasten the reaching of an agreement to 
the expense of its quality. By contrast, biased mediators, seeking to protect 
their protégés, will take care to ensure that there are stipulations in an 
agreement guaranteeing the interest of ‘their’ side or use their particular 
access and leverage to make their side agree to costly concessions. Biased 
mediation processes are therefore more likely than neutral mediation 
processes to lead to elaborated institutional arrangements that are generally 
considered conducive to democracy and durable peace, such as power 
sharing, third-party security guarantees, and justice provisions (Svensson 
2009:446).
Mediation is a critical step in conflict management, and the neutrality of a 
mediator may be difficult due to the likely influence of a power differential 
among parties to a conflict. This difficulty can be averted as adoption of some 
traditional logics of spirituality can contribute towards the success of the process. 
Rittle (2008) suggested that concerns for spirituality should be a top priority 
in conflict management strategies, with the belief in the sense of culpability to 
align human actions with God’s will and commands. Rittle’s suggestion aligns 
with African ontological mythology, which remains a central concern for the 
majority of the population in Africa. 
In most African societies, the traditional and the modern systems play 
complementary roles in ensuring peace and social cohesion. In a number of 
cases, during the early post-colonial administrations in Africa, traditional rulers 
formed one of the houses of parliament. Calls have been made for integrating 
traditional institutions such as the chieftaincy into modern constitution 
engineering in some cases. The official adoption of traditional measures of 
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conflict management will promote peace and development in Nigeria. The 
politics of conflict management is expected to connect with the predominant 
traditions of a society. 
Conclusion
The study is motivated by the rising spate of violent conflicts in Nigeria and 
the urgent need for adequate measures in managing them. It has focused on 
modalities for an integration of modern and traditional measures for peace-
building. The Nigerian government’s endeavours at managing violent conflicts 
have not yielded good results as they largely remain coercive and dismissive of 
local concerns. Various measures such as police, the military, curfew, propaganda, 
judicial panel, compensations, creation of new structures, and an offer of amnesty 
to prevent escalation of violence in Nigeria are replete with lapses, although they 
have been institutionalised. Similarly, emerging alternative measures such as 
vigilantes, militias, and ethnic solidarity have resulted in mixed results, whereas 
the original traditional approaches to conflict management remain grossly 
repressed. A synergy of different strategies can help in mitigating the rising 
spate of violence in Nigeria. The coincidence between the establishment of the 
Ministry for Niger Delta Affairs and the Joint Task Force (JTF)-driven violent 
raid on militants in the south-south as well as the militants’ revocation of the 
ceasefire constitute a contradiction and lack of integration in the extant conflict 
management strategies in Nigeria. 
A general concern for peace, security, and development remains central in both 
the traditional and modern strategies for conflict management despite the 
divergent approaches therein. Limitations of the official conflict management 
strategies and state failure to recognise and harness useful traditional approaches 
to social control have made conflicts uncontrollable in Nigeria. It is therefore 
recommended that the strengths of both the traditional and modern strategies 
of conflict management are essential and should be integrated to promote 
peace and development. An innovative policy is needed in this direction. The 
proposed innovative peace policy would promote fruitful collaboration among 
stakeholders, transformational leadership and a combination of traditional and 
modern conflict management strategies to stimulate development in Nigeria. 
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The fact that traditional and modern values have coexisted for centuries and 
would continue to do so provides additional justification for the proposed 
integration. 
Useful aspects of traditional social institutions must be utilised and integrated 
with the official security apparatus to ensure peace in the conflict-ridden 
contemporary Nigerian society. The key areas that must be addressed include 
the issues of land and social justice. These would promote security of lives 
and properties. The proportion of people that have been using traditional 
and modern means to eliminate their opponents over land disputes will be 
drastically reduced. A situation in which governments seize communal land 
and issue certificates of occupancy to the privileged few at exorbitant costs can 
undermine peacemaking efforts. Alternatively, governments can liaise with 
communities concerning the use of their lands for developmental purposes 
including the construction of infrastructures. If people perceive that the 
governments meet their needs they would be ready to serve the system and 
peace will reign. The question of resource control can also be addressed in this 
regard. Governance with sincerity and transparency will promote security. A 
genuine integration of modern and traditional conflict management strategies, 
excluding their pitfalls, would provide lasting solutions to avoidable conflicts in 
Nigeria. This will result in building democratic institutions of accountability, 
social inclusion, transparency in governance, and constructive development in 
Nigeria. Essentially, traditional communication infrastructure and ontological 
spirituality should be built into the synergised package for conflict management. 
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